Introduction
Since the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), international offsets have been considered an important ingredient of any efficient solution to climate change. International emission trading has the potential to reduce compliance costs because it makes it possible to exploit low cost mitigation options wherever they are located. Following this argument, numerous regional and sub-regional carbon market initiatives, either regulated or on a voluntary base, have emerged especially in developed countries 3 .
International offsets have also been a controversial issue. It is an important cost-containment mechanism, but if not well-designed it may undermine environmental effectiveness and technological change. In 2000, a lack of agreement on the implementation procedures of the Kyoto mechanisms led to the failure of negotiations at Hague. In 2004, the EU linking directive established the possibility to use Kyoto credits in the EU-ETS, without any limit. During the second Phase of emission trading, the EU decided to limit the quantity and the quality of offsets to avoid the price collapse faced during the first Phase.
Most of the existing or proposed cap-and-trade schemes include ceilings on international offsets.
For example, the Waxman-Markey Bill allows approximately 1 Billion tons of CO2 annually for international offsets (only half of this figure is considered in the currently discussed Senate bill by Kerry and Boxer). The European Union has proposed a cap between 1.4 and 1.6 Billion tons for the period between 2008 and 2020, an amount that could be increased in the case of more ambitious reduction. The Canadian emission trading scheme which should be launched in 2010 also contains a 10% limitation to the purchase of international offsets from CDM. Japan's newly elected Prime
Minister has increased the target on emission reduction from 8 to 25% by 2020 and he has proposed to cover up to 60% of its emission target through foreign carbon credits 4 .
A well-designed, global cap-trade-system has the potential to create the right incentives to engage developing countries (Wara and Victor 2008, Frankel 2008) . However, if most of the reduction burden were allocated to industrialised countries, then an unconstrained scheme would create a system of transfers from developed to developing countries. These flows might be substantial and arguably controversial. For example, Jacoby et. al (2008) found that the size of north-south side-3 payments would already reach US$ 400 Billion in 2020. This is four times the current spending on Official Development Assistance 5 . Furthermore, a well-functioning carbon market requires a solid infrastructure that guarantees the integrity of the transactions and provides market participants with reliable information. It also requires high quality monitoring, reporting, and verification. The experience with CDM, the largest existing international carbon market, has already revealed major problems concerning credit verification and quality certification of the projects involved (Wara and Victor 2008) . As long as these issues are not solved, institutional or administrative issues are likely to delay the establishment of a global market.
An additional line of reasoning is often promoted to discourage heavy reliance on international carbon offsets. When a polluting country faces the choice of whether innovating or purchase carbon credits, the cheapest option will be selected (Driesen 2003) . If permits are cheaper than investment costs in mitigation options at home, emission trading will create an incentive to shift abatement abroad, reducing total compliance costs, but also lowering the incentive to carry out innovation.
This is a known argument (see for example Hourcade et al. 1999) , which has been proposed again recently within the EU-ETS. Since the price collapse in 2006, the EU Commissions has favoured quantitative and qualitative restrictions on international offsets (de Sépibus 2008).
As discussed in Karp and Zhao (2009) , if limits to purchase credits are not large, economic losses might be modest and therefore it may be worthy to use them. These limits could avoid huge transfers to developing countries, make the agreement more appealing for industrialised countries, and stimulate innovation. The argument in favour of ceilings might be reinforced in a second-best world. Most estimates of the cost-saving effect of unrestricted emission trading schemes hold in a first-best world (e.g. Weyant and Hill 1999 , Bohm 1999 , Chander et al. 2002 , Paltsev et al. 2008 , Richels 2007 . When the only distortion is global pollution, international emission trading generates efficiency gains. However, the theory of a second-best world (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) suggests that addressing only one of the various market distortions, will not necessarily improve welfare.
Environmental economic literature suggests that multiple policy instruments should be employed, see Jaffe et al. (2003) , Jaffe et al. (2005) and Bennear and Stavins (2007) . In practice, however, designing several instruments can be complicated, and despite the various forms of regulation used 4 today, a market-based solution aimed at pricing CO2 is widely regarded as the most probable solution for the case of global warming.
The question of interest here is whether, in the presence of multiple externalities, restricting the use of international carbon offsets is a second-best policy recommendation. Market failures associated with the environmental externality interact with market failures associated with innovation and the diffusion of technologies. Climate policy is targeted at the environmental externality, but it is likely to have second order effects on the technology externality as well. Limiting international emission trading would lead to welfare losses in a first-best world. In a second-best world this might not be the case.
Few studies have addressed this issue. Golombek and Hoel (2006) analysed the welfare implications of trade in carbon permits in a second-best world where technology externalities are not internalised. They found that the second-best optimum is characterised by marginal costs of abatement exceeding the Pigovian tax in all countries. A tighter emission requirement is thus a way of compensating for the lack of technology policy. In a follow-up paper, Golombek and Hoel (2008) found that the price of carbon should differ across heterogeneous countries in the secondbest agreement. If the quota are assigned according to the second-best optimum, then there should be no emission trading. Whether emission trading is welfare enhancing or not, is an empirical question.
However, hardly any numerical evaluation of the economic role of international carbon offsets considers the role of technology externalities. Quantitative assessments in a second-best framework have mostly explored the role of pre-existing distortionary taxes. Babiker et al. (2004) and Paltsev et al. (2007) analysed the role of international emission trading in a second-best world, where the carbon price interacts with pre-exiting distortionary taxes. In that setting, terms-of-trade deterioration and tax-interaction effects prevail and emission trading leads to welfare losses in some regions. In the same manner, McKibbin et al. (1999) demonstrated how a country may lose from falling terms of trade after engaging in international emissions trading. Buonanno et al. (2000) assessed the pros and cons of introducing ceilings to emission trading in a model with endogenous technical change (ETC-RICE). However, financial flows to developing countries would be significantly reduced. Despite the revenue loss on the carbon market, non-OECD regions would be compensated by higher technological spillovers and lower energy prices. A limited access to international offsets spurs more innovation in constrained regions (OECD), which are also the most R&D-intensive countries.
Considering the effects on macroeconomic costs, financial flows, and innovation, our results indicate that a moderate quantitative limit on international offsets might be a second-best policy recommendation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the scenario set-up and the model. Section 3 illustrates the macroeconomic implications when international offsets can be used without constraints. Section 4 examines the consequences of restricting the use of permit trading.
Section 5 analyses the results for United States and Europe. Section 6 summarises and concludes.
Design of the climate scenario and methodology
The choice of the climate scenario is important for the analysis of carbon trading, since the size of the market depends on the overall stringency of the climate objective as well as the regional repartition of the mitigation burden. In this exercise, we consider a climate policy with a long-run stabilisation objective of 530 CO2-eq ppm (3.5 W/m^2), where most of the initial mitigation effort is on developed regions. A target of this kind is less stringent than what is required to achieve the 2 6 degrees Celsius objective, but would nonetheless necessitate very significant global mitigation in the next few decades. More stringent commitments in the developed countries match the graduation approach envisaged by the UNFCCC, aimed at accounting for differentiated responsibilities. The chosen scheme shares the main characteristics of other policy architectures recently proposed in the literature (Victor 2007 , Bosetti et al. 2008 , Bosetti and Frankel 2009 , Frankel 2008 The model includes a range of technology options that describe the final use of energy and power generation. Electricity can be generated using low carbon options, such as nuclear and hydroelectric power, coal with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), wind turbines, and photovoltaic panels.
We model diffusion processes via experience curves, though only for the innovative technologies.
The model also includes Learning-By-Searching in which R&D investments endogenously lead to improvements in energy efficiency and to reduced costs of advanced low carbon technologies.
Both energy innovation and diffusion are activities characterised by international spillovers (Bosetti et. al. 2008a) . Each region can benefit from the stock of knowledge developed elsewhere through domestic investments. However, the appropriation of the benefits from knowledge spillovers requires local investments to build up absorptive capacity. A time lag in the spillover of knowledge pool is also assumed. On the contrary, international experience spillovers are free and they are determined by the global deployment of the technology.
Besides technology spillovers, two additional channels of interaction are the international markets of exhaustible resources and the carbon market. International prices of fossil fuels are determined 7 The European Union has proposed reductions up to 30% by 2020, compared to 1990, in the presence of an international agreement. In this paper we assume a 20% reduction by 2020, compared to 1990, because the policy becomes global only after 2020, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htm. The structure of the model allows us to consider the most salient features of the climate mitigation policy, and to do so in a second-best setting. Although this model is a step-up over standard integrated assessment modelling that normally features only the climate externality, it falls short of thoroughly representing a second-best world. For example, no international trade of capital is assumed and pre-exiting distortionary taxes and subsidies are not accounted for in this exercise. Our model captures market failures related to international spillovers only in the energy sector, as no general purpose R&D is assumed. No learning is considered for known, yet potentially improvable technologies, such as nuclear power and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Thus, this exercise provides an account of only some of the most relevant sources of global interaction.
No restrictions on the use of international carbon offsets
We begin by evaluating the implications of the climate stabilisation scenario on economic activity and carbon market when no exogenous constraint is imposed on international permit trading. We refer to this case as the "full offsets hypothesis". Full cooperation is assumed to be supported by a fully-fledged, perfectly functioning, international carbon market, which is operative from 2020 onward.
Macroeconomic costs
The macroeconomic costs induced by the chosen stabilisation policy are reported in Table 2 , in absolute levels and in percentage terms. OECD countries face higher costs as they have signed upon the tightest commitments. Non-OECD countries slightly gain until mid century, mostly due to permit revenues, but lose in the long-term. The 1% global figure lies within the range reported in the literature (IPCC 2007) , though one should keep in mind that the climate stabilisation objective considered here is not very ambitious compared to the 2 degrees Celsius. The RECIPE model intercomparison analysed the economics of a comparable climate policy and it found that stabilisation costs range between 1.4% and 0.1% of global discounted consumption (Luderer et al. 2009 ). Low costs are also due to the assumption of immediate participation and full flexibility among greenhouse gases abatement options. Departure from any of these assumptions increases costs substantially. For example, found that limited availability of mitigation technologies would impose an additional penalty of roughly 70% whereas a 20-year delay in global action would increase costs by 160%. The role of delayed participation of developing countries was also emphasised in the recent EMF22 modelling comparison exercise (Clarke et al. 2009 ).
The carbon market and financial implications: the "full offsets hypothesis"
Without any restriction, countries rely on the international carbon market, an important element of flexibility that increases efficiency. Table 3 shows the evolution of the carbon market over time.
The market size is already significant in 2020, when almost 3 Billion tons of CO2 (equal to roughly half of today's emissions in the US) are exchanged internationally, enough to require the establishment of considerable institutional and monitoring capacity. The initially low carbon price (due to the assumption of global participation and wide basket of GHGs) is such that the market value is contained at the outset, but grows significantly over time, driven by the convex path of the carbon price. to US$ 1.7 Trillion in 2050, which is more than 2% of OECD GDP (Table 4) . Therefore, OECD countries face a trade-off. On the one hand, laissez fair would maximise costeffectiveness and contain economic costs. On the other hand, it would entail substantial financial flows, which may undermine the willingness of industrialised countries to commit. If the climate externality were the only distortion in the economy, restrictions to carbon trade would create a wedge in marginal abatement costs across countries, reducing economic efficiency. However, restricting trade might be a second-best policy recommendation. At the same time, a perfectly functioning international carbon market might not be available in 2020 because technical problems such as the lack of institutional capacity, reliable monitoring, and verification systems might delay or fragment the establishment of a global market.
The next section tackles both issues and it considers a departure from the "full offsets hypothesis" along three directions:
• "When": the establishment of an international carbon market is delayed to a future date between 2030 and 2045 • "How much": until 2045, only a fraction of abatement, ranging from 20% to 10% of regional abatement, can be met through the international carbon market • "Where": only a subset of regions joins from the outset (2020) of the international carbon market. A selected number of other regions join in 2045.
Departing from the "full offsets hypothesis"

Restrictions along the "when" dimension
Although OECD regions hope to have an OECD-wide emission trading scheme in 2015, the lack of international policy coordination may slow down the whole process, postponing the establishment of a global carbon market. If this were the case, OECD countries would be required to compensate for the missing trade with additional domestic abatement. Table 5 reports consumption losses when access to international offsets is delayed over time by 10, 15, 20, or 25 years. Postponing the establishment of an international carbon market increases global macroeconomic costs moderately for delays until 2030-2035, but waiting until 2045 raises the policy bill by about 50%. This is driven by additional losses in OECD regions. Instead, in non-OECD the (moderate) consumption costs are halved, reducing the global penalty. Welfare improvements in these regions are a second-best result, driven by positive technology spillovers, and lower energy prices. They also depend on the assumption that non-OECD countries commit to considerably milder emission reduction objectives compared to OECD. With limited access to international offsets, OECD regions substantially decrease their demand of all fossil fuels (traditional gas, coal, and oil), oil in particular. The reduced use of oil in OECD countries lowers its international price, benefiting non-OECD regions. This effect is also known as energy market effect, which is one of the possible sources of carbon leakage. A second channel that is not discussed in this paper works through changes in terms-of-trade and international competitiveness of energy-intensive industries 12 .
All in all, the contraction of oil demand in OECD countries is only partially offset by carbon leakage in non-OECD, which increases the oil demand by 11% (on average) between 2020 and 2040. 
Additional global investments Global investment cost reduction (Rhs axes)
A similar result is observed for investments in energy efficiency R&D, which globally increase throughout the century, but by a larger magnitude during the transition period without emission trading. The global increase is mostly driven by additional investments in OECD countries. Non-OECD countries slightly reduce their R&D effort in the short-run, but increase it after 2035.
Restrictions along the "how much" dimension
This section assumes that an international carbon market will already be in place in 2020, but with quantitative restrictions on the use of international offsets, mimicking most of the existing and proposed cap-and-trade schemes. Table 6 illustrates the regional shares of abatement that would be met from international offsets in the absence of any form of market restriction. Without any ceiling, and for this given distribution of allowances, developed countries would find it optimal to buy between 18% and 54% of their abatement on the international market. Already a mild restriction of 20% would be binding for most developed countries, especially in the short-run and in Europe. The United States is right at the limit. The macroeconomic costs of the stabilisation policy when only up to 20%, 15% or 10% of total abatement in each region can be done with international offsets are reported in Table 7 . In terms of global consumption losses, a mild restriction such as 20% creates costs that are comparable to postponing trade to 2030 (1.12% consumption loss). Tighter restrictions (10%) have costs comparable to postponing trade to at least 2035 (1.17% consumption loss).
The dynamics of regional costs depends not only on the interactions between the effects outlined before (energy market and technology spillovers), but also on the trading position of each region. In the short-term, net sellers (non-OECD) tend to lose because of the contraction of the market and, as a consequence, of the carbon price. The non-OECD regions supply is rationed and therefore they emit more. However, they anticipate that after 2045 there will be a lager demand of permits and therefore they still keep emissions below the initial allocation. Throughout the century, limiting trade to 10% of regional abatement increases non-OECD welfare by about 40% because revenue losses on the carbon market are offset by the energy market effects and technology spillovers.
The effect on net buyers (OECD) depends on whether the limit is binding or not. When the limit is binding, the region loses because more expensive abatement options have to substitute for imported credits. This occurs especially in Europe. If the limit is not binding, the region gains because carbon permits are cheaper. This is the case of the US where in 2030 the 20% restriction is not binding (see also Section 3) 13 . To quantify the contribution of the energy market effect and technology spillovers, we consider three variations of the 15% scenario in which either or both effects are switched off 14 . Table 8 shows the macroeconomic losses of each case expressed in US$ Trillion. Figures indicate that the technology spillover effect is somewhat larger than the energy market effect, though in both cases the efficiency losses are small when compared to the overall policy costs shown in Table 2 by a few percentage points. The reason for this, as noted above, is that the stringent climate stabilisation policy considered in this paper requires a drastic switch of the energy system from a fossil fuel based to a low carbon one even in the case with full access to international offsets. This limits the additional room for reduction in the prices of energy and low carbon fuels when trade is constrained.
The technology spillovers channel is found to be higher in OECD regions. Despite being closer to the technology frontier, developed countries have to comply with a very stringent domestic commitment (especially when trade is limited) that requires fast and major investments in low carbon mitigation options, such as wind and solar. Thus, the gains of equal reduction of investment costs in renewables (given by the assumption of global learning by doing) benefits developed countries more than developing ones. On the contrary, the energy market effect is larger for Non-OECD countries, which are confronted with less demanding mitigation obligations and can procrastinate the consumption of fossil fuels. Another prominent argument used to justify ceilings on international offsets is to limit the flows of financial resources from OECD to other regions. The question is whether it is worthy to bear additional economic costs in order to reduce financial outflows. 
Restrictions along the "where" dimension
In the last case, we turn to the situation in which an international carbon market already exists in 2020, but some regions do not take part until 2045. As noted by Frankel (2008) , it could be that the eligibility to sell permits is restricted to countries with good international governance ratings, or that commit to invest the revenue in green projects, or that have demonstrated ability to abide to commitments. We analyse the implications of delaying the participation of three groups of developing regions that in the global carbon market would play the role of net sellers: Energy Exporting Regions (Middle East and North Africa and Russia), Developing Asia (China and India) and Rest of World (Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa).
Excluding either region from the international carbon market has limited effects on global macroeconomic costs (Table 9) , essentially because others compensate the absence of a seller with increased supply. The only case that leads to a visible additional global penalty is the exclusion of Developing Asia, which supplies more than 50% of the demand of permits. For example, the price of carbon in 2025 would double if Developing Asia were not included in the market, whereas it would increase by only a few percentage points if other regions were to delay. This result stems from the fact that emerging economies such as China and India are assumed to host the largest base of mitigation opportunities. It also reinforces the known argument that any climate policy has to look East to be effective. 
Implications for the United States and Europe
This section focuses on the United States and Europe, which have both proposed quantitative and qualitative limits on international offsets. Figure 4 shows macroeconomic costs in the US and Europe when international offsets can be used freely and under different ceilings. Two different behaviours can be detected. For Europe, policy macroeconomic costs are quite sensitive to the tightening of the limit to trade. As shown in Table 6 , Europe relies quite significantly on the international carbon market. Complete reliance on domestic abatement would result in a considerable economic cost, with mid-term consumption losses slightly above 3%. A 15% ceiling would induce a penalty of about 20%, though from a lower base compared to the US. 
United States Europe
20
The US reports a mild sensitivity to restrictions in offsets, and actually a potential for short-term and mid-term welfare gain for limits of 20% and 15%. A 20% restriction would not be binding. As explained in Section 3, a non-binding ceiling generates benefits because it reduces the carbon price and thus, the expenditure for carbon credits. The 15% restriction is binding, but spillovers and the energy market effects compensate the additional costs, leading to short-term welfare gains and only to a 1% long-term additional penalty. A mild restriction could (slightly) ease the costs of the climate policy in the US, provided all OECD countries adhere to the same trade limit rule. This last condition is important because the US would profit from the reduction in oil prices and in investment costs of low carbon technologies induced by the tighter commitment in the rest of OECD, too. Because equivalent offsets restrictions lead to relatively more abatement in Europe and other OECD countries, they also induce more investments in innovation outside the US. Europe has to comply with a 20% reduction by 2020, therefore it begins to invest in mitigation options earlier.
As for CO 2 prices, limiting the access to the international carbon market implies that marginal abatement costs are not equalised across countries. Permit buyers (sellers) would face a higher (lower) cost of carbon than the price of permits in the full offsets case. For example, a 15% limit on trade would raise the cost of carbon significantly more in Europe than in the US, as shown in Figure   5 . The US would have economic benefits from imposing a slightly higher carbon tax and relying less on international offsets, provided Europe and the rest of OECD were also willing to adopt equally stringent (but with a higher impact on marginal costs of abatement) measures. 
Summary and conclusions
The use of international carbon offsets in achieving climate stabilisation targets has always been a prominent issue in climate negotiations, but few studies have assessed its role in a second-best setting. This paper fills this gap by studying the macroeconomic and the financial consequences of international offsets when multiple externalities are considered. It provides a numerical evaluation of how different constraints on the size, timing, and participation to an international carbon market affect the macroeconomic costs of climate policy, international financial transfers and the stimulus to carry out innovation.
We have shown that for a climate policy entailing deep emission cuts in OECD countries (-90% compared to 2005 in 2050) , an unrestricted international carbon market would entail financial transfers that are initially small but that would grow very rapidly, equating today's OECD gas imports in 2025 and today's OECD oil imports in 2040.
Limiting the access to international offsets provides an additional stimulus to innovation and deployment of low carbon technologies, and decreases the consumption of fossil fuels in OECD countries. International spillovers of both knowledge and experience extend the benefits of technological change to non-OECD regions as well. For moderate restrictions on international offsets, we found that technology spillovers and energy market effects can compensate the lower revenue from the carbon market. our results indicate that a moderate quantitative limit to the use of international offsets, such as the 15% proposed in Europe and in the US, might be a second-best policy recommendation.
Appendix. The WITCH model
Full details on the WITCH model can be found in Bosetti et al. (2007) and .
This appendix provides a brief summary of the model. It recalls the most distinguishing features related to environmental, economic, and technology externalities, and the game-theoretic set-up.
Brief model description
WITCH is a dynamic optimal growth model ("top-down") with a "bottom-up" representation of the The WITCH model includes a range of technology options that describe the use of energy and power generation. Different fuels can be used for electricity generation and final consumption: coal, oil, gas, uranium, and biofuels. Electricity can be generated using a series of traditional fossil fuelbased technologies and carbon-free options. Fossil fuel-based technologies include natural gas combined cycle (NGCC)and fuel oil and pulverised coal (PC) power plants. Coal-based electricity can also be generated using integrated gasification combined cycle production with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). Low carbon technologies include hydroelectric and nuclear power, wind A reduced-form damage function, D(n,t), describes a relationship between regional damages and global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial levels, T(t). The quadratic functional form makes it possible to account for both gains and losses:
Physical impacts can be translated into monetary units by including the damage function into the final production function. Equation (A2) expresses climate change damages as fraction of final output, YGROSS:
International knowledge spillovers for energy enhancing R&D Investments in energy R&D build up a stock of knowledge (HE) that improves overall energy efficiency. The energy knowledge stock augments the quantity of final energy services (ES) that can be provided per unit of physical energy (EN), according to a Constant Elasticity formulation:
Learning processes during knowledge accumulation or deployment of advanced technologies will not be confined within the boundaries of investing countries, but knowledge and expertise are likely to spill, with some lag, worldwide. Therefore, the generation of new ideas is characterised by an innovation possibility frontier that exhibits both intertemporal and international spillovers. At each point in time, new ideas (Z) are produced using a Cobb-Douglas combination between domestic investments (I R&D ), the domestic stock of knowledge (HE), and the foreign stock of knowledge
The contribution of foreign knowledge is not immediate, but it depends on the interaction between two components shown in equation (A5). The first term describes countries' absorptive capacity whereas the second one captures the distance of each region from the technology frontier. The technology frontier is represented by the stock of knowledge in high-income countries (USA, WEURO, EEURO, KOSAU, and CAJANZ): We assume full technology spillover: investments in additional capacity by virtuous regions drive down investment costs worldwide within a model time period, which corresponds to five years. The progress ratio, PR, defines the speed of learning.
International knowledge and experience spillovers in breakthrough technologies
The WITCH model includes two backstop technologies. These are innovative technologies with low or zero carbon emissions that are currently not commercialised and that necessitate dedicated innovation investments to become economically competitive and available in large supplies. For the purpose of modelling, a backstop technology can be seen of as a compact representation of a portfolio of advanced technologies that would become available before a few decades. The costs of these technologies are modelled with a two-factor learning curve. The unit cost of each backstop technology, ( c − ) and they define the speed of learning. The learning ratio lr is the rate at which costs decline each time the cumulative capacity doubles, while lrs is the rate at which costs decline at the doubling of the knowledge stock.
We set the initial prices of the backstop technologies at roughly 10 times the 2005 price of commercial equivalents. The cumulative deployment of the technology is initiated at an arbitrarily low value, 1,000twh and 1,000EJ for the electric and non-electric, respectively. Backstop technologies are assumed to be renewable in the sense that the fuel cost component is negligible.
The backstop for power generation is assumed to operate at load factors comparable with those of baseload power generation.
Backstops substitute linearly nuclear power in the electric sector, and oil in the non-electric one.
Once backstop technologies become competitive, their uptake is not immediate and complete, but rather we assume a transition/adjustment period. These penetration limits capture the inertia in the system, as large deployment of these advanced technologies will require investment and reorganisation in energy infrastructure. At each point in time, the upper limit is equal to 5% of energy produced by other technologies and the backstop itself in the previous period.
International energy markets
The markets of exhaustible resources are assumed to be integrated and they are represented as an international market for each fuel. International prices depend on fossil fuels extraction, which in turn is driven by regional consumption.
The model considers four non-renewable fuels: coal, crude oil, natural gas, and uranium. Their costs follow a long-term trend that reflects their exhaustibility. Resource prices are calculated endogenously using a reduced-form cost function that allows for non-linearity in both the depletion effect and in the rate of extraction. Assuming competitive markets, the domestic price ( ) t n P f , is equal to the marginal cost and it depends on the cumulative quantity of fossil fuels extracted, Qf (n,t):
